[Blink] Blink stores plain word passwords in its config file?

[Dan Pascu]

On 24 Nov 2010, at 14:18, Tomasz Muszynski wrote:

> Wiadomość napisana przez Dan Pascu w dniu 2010-11-24, o godz. 10:09:
>> On 24 Nov 2010, at 01:08, Adrian Georgescu wrote:
>>
>>> This is technically possible. Implementing keychain support in the  
>>> configuration framework
>>
>> actually things are not that simple. sipsimple's configuration  
>> framework is platform agnostic, we cannot simply add keychain  
>> support there as it is only available on the mac.
>
> switch(platform)
> {
> case "OSX": // use keychain
> case "Linux": // probably use sherlock

Or probably kwallet. Or should that be gnome-keyring instead? Or maybe  
all?
Are you kidding me? Linux is probably the messiest of all considering  
how many different implementations of a keyring system are out there.

> default: // use plain file

So Windows (which probably has the most users of all systems) is left  
out in the cold. Good solution indeed.

> }
>
> Come on! That's not so hard to implement!

I'm awaiting your patches with interest.

>
>> plus as I said, having keychain support doesn't mean that the  
>> password cannot be logged after it was obtained from keychain.  
>> blink has a fundamental difference from other applications that  
>> come with your mac: it is available with the full source, which  
>> makes modifying it trivial. The point is that unless you completely  
>> trust anyone that uses your system, you have no guarantees of  
>> security.
>
> I disagree. That way, You shouldn't use any tools like KeePass,  
> that's because your filesystem is "very secure" and You don't need  
> any other protection like not using root account or giving your  
> computer to anyone... Also, every software written in Java or .Net  
> (or any other jit based language) would be very unsecure as using  
> reflection you can get source code from it's byte code. Thats not  
> true. And finally, there are hackers that can restore any password  
> from any place... so, let don't protect any software and don't hash  
> any passwords as always someone can crack it :)

As it was already said here, this is not high on our priority list,  
but patches are welcome. :)

> As I've read in specification, SIP uses MD5 passwords. So, why not  
> to store that encrypted password? If user changes authentication  
> method then he will need to reenter the password, but again, it's  
> stored locally in already encrypted form.

So what? Someone can use the encrypted form as well as the plaintext  
password once it gets a hold of it. You can use it to build your MD5  
challenge responses, what makes you think someone else can't? Who  
cares if I have the original password or the hashed form as long as I  
can build correct responses to challenge requests from the server.

--
Dan